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IN THE SUPREME· COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE. s~T1ATE· OF U·TAH, 
Plaintiff and Responden.tJ 
vs. 
ARDEN E. TUT'TLE, 




Appeal from a Judgment of the District Court of 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, rendered by the 
Honorable Henry Ruggeri. 
STA·T'EMENT O·F 'T'HE KIND OF ~cASE 
The Appellant, Arden E. Tuttle, appe~ls from the 
conviction of the crime of Grand Larceny in the District 
Court of Sanpete 1County, State of Utah. 
DISPO·SIT'ION IN LOWER CO~URT 
The Appellant was charged with the crirne of Grand 
Larceny in violation of 76-38-1 and 4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, in the District ,c·ourt of Sanpete· 'County, 
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State of Utah. Upon a jury trial, the Appellant was 
convicted and sentenced by the Honorable Henry Rug-
geri, Judge. 
RE.LIEF SO·UGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment of 
the District Court. 
ST·A·TEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the jury trial of the above cause the State evi-
dence showed that one Milton S.Harman was a partner 
in the business of operating a general merchandise store 
in Manti, Utah, on the 18th day of November, 1961. 
On this day the Appellant "\\7as hauling coal to his 
resjdence, also in Manti, Utah, from the general stor(:-\. 
Mr. Milton S. Harman left the business approxi1nately 
at 8 :00 p.m. ( R-4 7), and secured the door and took 
the cash and check the till out and left some dimes, 
nickels, and pennies in the cash register. (R-48). Upon 
his return to the store on the 19th day of November, 
1961, at approximately 9:00 to 10:00 a.In. J\fr. J\1ilton 
Harman discovered that the coins \vere gone. Also, he 
discovered that five of the follo"ring firearms were 
1nissing: (R-150) Winchester Auton1a.tic Shotgun; Rein-
ington P't1n1pgun; 464 Magnum Gun; 22 Pumpgun; 22 
Single Shot Rifle. Later he determined that other 
111i~eellaneous items \vere Inissing, to-\\.,.it: A box of 410 
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shotgun shells, telescopic sight 4 power, recoil pads, 
cleaning kit, 2 magnum boxes, Winchester 12 gauge 3 
inches, 2 boxes of 2,2 long, 2 boxes of 22 short, all of the 
30 ott 6 and 22 bird shot. The owner, Mr. Harman, did 
not discover the 22 bird shot as missing until the same 
were submitted into evidence, (R-55). No inventory of 
the missing items 'vas taken on the 19th day of N ovem-
ber, 1961, (R-67). 
Mr. Harman stated that no running inventory was 
kept of any of the items which -vvere alleged to have been 
taken, (R-7 4), and in fact, the 22 single shot rifle was 
not reported as missing until the same was located in the 
reservoir, (R-76). Additional ite·ms were not discovered 
missing while the City ~1arshall was present to investi-
gate the alleged theft, (R.-83). 
A 'Cornplaint charging the Appellant with Grand 
Larceny was signed on the 16th day of May, 196-3, 
(R-64), from 18 months after the date of the alleged 
larceny. 
·Calvin :D. Nielson, City Marshall of Manti, Ulah, 
testified as to the conversation had with the Appellant 
on the 21st day of D·ecember, 1961, and on the 26th 
day of December, 1961, wherein theAppellant denied 
any knowledge of the theft, (R-95). Then after waiting 
approximately one year, on the 29th day of November, 
1962, the City Marshall & Leon Harmon co-owner went 
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to the Appellant's parents' home, and ask the· Appel-
lant's mother permission to look for the property, (R-
96). At this time the Appellant was not residing at 
his parents home but was on active service in the Air 
Force. Upon arrival at the Appellant's home, the City 
Marshall did not have a search warrant (R-114) ; and 
when asked for a search vvarrant, Mrs. ·Tuttle testified 
that the ·City J\'Iarshall stated, "Oh, we don't need onP.", 
(R-270). The City Marshall indicated that a search \var-
rant could probably be obtained, (R-115). A conflict in 
the evidence arose at this point, and Mrs. T·uttle testi-
fied that at the time the City Marshall came to the 
house they stated that they wanted to find out and get 
straight and to make a search and do what they could 
and further stated that if the Appellant, was found 
guilty he would lose his citizenship; and if they brought 
hin1 out of the Army he would be dishonorably discharged 
and would not be able to own any property of any sort. 
Further, Mrs.. Tuttle testified that they attempted to 
be friendly enough about it and stated that \Ve \\'"ere on 
good terms with the Har1nons, and she indicated that 
if they wanted to go ahead and search knowing that 
thPy vvere violating the la,v, they could, "Thich they did. 
(R-271, R-273) 
In conducting the search of the house, after finding 
nothing in th8 opening of the rafters of the room occu-
pied h~T the appellant before his departure to the Air 
Force, (R-196), the ~City I\Iarshall, together with ·Leon-
ard Harmon, discovered an old phonograph and finding 
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it padlocked proceeded to undue the screws. (R--116)). 
As a result of said search, the following items were ob-
tained; Exhibit 2, 22 shells and cartons; Exhibit 3, 2 
boxes; Exhibit 4, 2 rehead recoil pads in boxes; E,xhibit 
5, 2 boixes marked "\vith a black crayon or pencil; Ex-
hibit 6, 2 boxes; Exhibit 7, boxes; Exhibit 8, boxes with 
writing in ink and stuck together with scotch tape, R-
101). 'These items of evidence were taken from the Ap-
pellant's mother's home to Milton S. Harmon's home 
without any identifying marks placed on them. From 
Milton S. Harmon's home the City Marshall picked the 
san1e up the following day or the next day and placed 
them in the city vault and later showed them to the 
c·ounty Attorney. All of these Exhibits were unmarked, 
(R-122-124). In fact, the above referred to Exhibits 
from 2 to 8 were not marked until the time of Prelimin-
ary Hearing, (R-118, 124). Thereafter the State sub-
mitted the following Exhibits : E'xhibit 10, a pump gun 
\Vith a Serial number; Exhibit 12, an automatic shotgun; 
Exhibit 13, a pump 22; Exhibit 14, a barrel, no serial 
number, (R-195). T·hese items of evidence were found 
in the Gunnison Reservoir Bed in approximately N ovein-
ber, 1963, by Richard Harmon. (R-137) Upon discover-
ing these weapons, the same were taken over to Milton 
S. I-Iarmon's residence where they were cleaned. It 
should be noted that none of the foregoing Exhibits 
\Yere connected to the Appellant. In laying a foundation 
for the admittance of the evidence, it should be noted tha 
l~ielson S. Harmon never did examine Exhibit 2 when 
the same was taken to his house, (R-151). However, 
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Milton s .. Harmon then testified as follows in connection 
with the Exhibits submitted. As to Eochibit 2, he identi-
ified the price as his writing; Exhibit 3, testified that 
it "\\Tas his marking, although he admits he "could not 
tell you f that was the same paint or not," (R-152); 
Exhibit 4, his markings, (R-152); Exhibit 6, his mark-
ings; Exhibit 7, testified that this is exactly the same 
knd of box; Exhibit 8, B. B. Bird Shot, 22 was marked 
\vith a piece of paper with scotch tape around it \Yhich 
was the method he marked this type of merchandise. 
Further, he testified as to the market value of the 
various guns, (R-62-163). The State further submitted 
State's E,xhibit 15 which contained a package received 
from 1\frs. Tuttle, which contained the following items: 
10 boxes of shot and shell 410s ; a full carton of 22 longs; 
and 7 boxes of 30.06 shells. Exhibit 16 was a receipt for 
said items dated the 7th day of December, 1962. The 
tiinely objection to the admittanee of the evidence "Tas 
1nade on the grouds that said evidence \Yas obtained 
as a result of an unla\Yful search and seizure, (R-211). 
A eonflict in the evidence again arose concerning 
a conversation had with the Appellant in the presence 
of his mother and father, Louis Eakland, ~Iilton Har-
Inon, Leonard Harmon, and Calvin Neilson, on the 23rd 
day of December, 1962. Officer Neilson testified that 
\\'"hPn thP Appellant \\'"as eonfronted \Yith taking these 
itPins, the defendant admitted that he had and that he 
dPHired to pay for them. (R-104-105) 
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The record is devoid of any statement by the Marsh-
all informing the Appellant that he had a right to re~ 
main silent, and that anything said could be used against 
him in a trial; and that he was entitled to an attorney. 
Edgar Tuttle, the Appellant's father, testified that 
the City Marshall had threatened to bring the defendant 
out of the service with a dishonorable discharge and loss 
of citizenship. (R-251). Further he testified that the 
defendant denied taking any· of the items. (R-251). 
The Appellant took the witness stand on his behalf 
and stated that he owned a 30.06 Model 1917 Enfield, 
·Caliber 30.06, gauge three inch magnum shotgun, four 
ten shot gun, .22 single shot and .22 Winchester Model 
Six pump .22. (R-278) Further he had purchased the 
vV eaver scope, exhibit 2, together with the shot gun 
cleaning kit, exhibit 3, recoil pads, exhibit 4, · and bird 
shot .22, exhibit 8 at various times in 1961 from the Har-
mon store. (R-281) Other exhibits 5 (empty boJCes) 
the contents of which were traded for .06 shells; exhibit 
6 (22 bullets) was purchased in cartons through the 
years; exhibit 7 (empty carton) the contents of which 
were also purchased. 
As to the purported confession, the Appellant stated 
that he admitted no guilt, but when confronted with pos-
sible dishonorable Discharge, loss of citizenship, and 
such other matters, he agreed to pay for the miSSing 
items. (R-288) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The time of sentencing was set for April 1, 1964, at 
"rhich time the Appellant made a motion for a new trial 
based on the fact that the evidence submitted in the trial 
"ras as a result of an unlawful search and seizure, citing 
Mapp v Ohio. The court denied motion for a new trial 
(R-351) and (R-344). 
ARGTJ~1ENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS TWO 
TO EIGHT OVER THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT 
SAID EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN 
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE;TO WIT. 
SUB POINT I. THAT THE SEARCH WAS EXPLOR-
ATORY IN NATURE AND CONDUCTED WITHOUT A 
SEARCH W AR.RANT. 
SUB-POINT II. THAT THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW 
CONSENT TO MAKE THE SEARCH. 
The record clearly indicates that Calvin Nielson, 
(~ity Marshall of Manti, together "'ith Leonard Harmon 
'vent to the defendant's parents home and searched the 
house without a search warrant. At the time of th~ 
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search, the defendant was away on active duty in the 
United States Air Force. (R~96) There is no doubt 
that the city marshall had knowledge· of the defendant's 
absence. Not finding anything incriminating in the open-
ing into the rafters of the room occupied by the defend-
ant, Leonard Harman, in the presence of the· City Mar-
shall, proceeded to disengage the screws in the old phono-
graph player (R-116) which was padlocked (R-270) and 
discovered the following items: (R-96·-97) 
1. :22 shells and cartons-exhibit 2 
2. T·wo boxes-exhibit 3 
3. Two rehead recoil pad in boxes-exhibit 4 
-1-. T'v{O boxes-exhibit 5 
5. Two boxes-exhibit 6 
6. Boxes of 22 longs-exhibit 7 
7. Bird shot 22 shot-exhibit 8 
The above items were submitted against the defend-
ant over the defendant's objection that the items were 
taken as a result of an unlavvful search and seizurP. 
(R-211) 
On June, 1961, The Supreme Court of the United 
States in Mapp ve. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6L Ed. 2d lORl, 
Rl S.'C. 1684, in a pr(~cedent shattering decision, held 
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that as a matter of due process, evidence obtained by a 
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
is inadmissable in a State Court through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. ·T·he so-called exclusionary rule established 
in Weeks vs. U.S., (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L.Ed 652, 34 
S1C 341, LRA 1915 B 834, Ann Cas 1915 C1177, \vas made 
expressly applicable to the State of Utah and other states 
and Wolf vs. Colorado, (19·49') 338 U.S. 25, 9,3 L.Ed. 
1782, 69 SC 1359 was overrule·d. ·The question, left an-
swered in the Mapp case, as to whether the states \\TPre 
obligated to adopt the Federal· standard, and therefore 
federal precedent, as to unreasonableness of the search 
and siezure, was answered in K er vs. California, 37 4 l .... S. 
23, 83 S.C., 1623, 10 L.Ed. 726 (1963), wherein the Justice 
Clark speaking for the majority stated that the Fourth 
Amendment \vas enforceable against the state." 
". . . by the same sanction of exclusion as in 
used against the federal government by the appli-
eation of the same constitutional standard pro-
hibiting unreasonable searches and seizures." 
The force of the Supreme 'Court of the United States 
in this area was made known by Stoner vs. California, 
84 S.C. 889, (1964) and Louden vs. State, No. 6 Misc., 
decided on Octo her 12, 1964, \Y here in the United States 
Supreme Court in a per curium decision vacated the 
judgrnent of conviction of the Utah 'Court on the bases 
of' Stoner raf;P. Also see Green vs. Yeager, (Habeus 'Corp-
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us Proceeding), 223 R Supp 545 (19·63) and Common-
wealth vs. Spofford) 180 N.E. 2d 673 (1962) wherein the 
Court looked to and applied Federal law. 
·Clearly, the above decisions have greatly affected 
criminal law in States, such as Utah, that have not had 
the exclusionary rule. These decisions have forced the 
States to re-analyze their positions and seek to apply 
the exclusionary rule in accordance with the Mapp-Ker 
mandate. In doing so, Massachusetts, Conneticut, New 
York, and -r.; e\Y Jersey, have looked to Federal precedent. 
Florida and Illinois already having the exclusionary, 
look to Federal precedents as a matter of policy. (See 
California and the 4th Amendment, 16 Stan L Rev. 318 
(March 1964) ) . 
Pennsylvania stands alone in its quest against the 
Federal precedents. Utah, prior to State vs. LaudenJ 
Supra, was in a similar position. Since the Landen case, 
Utah is forced to follow that Federal mandate in re-
gards to reasonableness of the searches and seizures. 
The law of lTtah has clearly been Mapped. 
·The Appellant contends that the search herein con-
ducted should be condemned as an exploratory in nature 
and without a search warrant. As a general rule, except 
as incident to a lawful arrest or invitation or consent 
without warrant, no search can be made of a private 
residence without a search warrant. This is necessarily 
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based upon time honored legal maximum that ''every 
man's house is his castle." The rule as to a private resi-
dence applies equally to an apartment or room used as 
a dwelling by a preson even though the family of such 
person may be occupying his main abode elsewhere. 
Moulton vs. State of Oklahoma, 227 p·.2d 695, (1951), 
Billup vs. State, 116 Tex. Cr. 63, 31 SW2d 8211. (1930). 
The Federal rule in this area indicates that a search 
\\Tarrant must be procurred when "practicable" in the 
case of a search incident to arrest. Trupianno vs. [J.S., 
68 Sup. C. 12229, 334 U.S. 699, 92 L.Ed. 1G63 C. A. and 
U.S. vs. Assendio, ,c·. A., Pa., 171 F2d 122. However, to 
the extent that the Trupianno case requires a search 
warrant solely on the bases of practicability of procur-
ring it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search 
after lawful arrest, the case was over-ruled. S·ee r;.s. 
vs. Rabinotoitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. 'C. 430, (19·50) \vherein 
thP ,c·ourt stated, in addition to over-ruling Trupianno, 
"T'he relevant test is not whether it is reason-
able to procure a search warrant, but whether the 
search was reasonable. That criterion in turn 
depends upon the facts and circumstances - the 
total atmosphere of the case .... " 
It is submitted that even under the ruling of the 
last case, the search herein conducted was unreasonable. 
ThP Rabinowitz case, supra, stated that the requirement 
of obtaining a search warrant should not be crystalized 
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into a sine quo non to reasonableness of a search. Fur-
ther the court stated that it is not disputed that there 
may be reasonable searches, incident to an arrest, with-
out a search warrant. In the instance case, there was 
no arrest at the time of the search. In fact, the defendant 
was not arrested until some 18 months of the alleged 
crime. The alleged crime occurred on November 19·, 1961, 
and the search was conducted on November 29, 1962, 
one year after the date of the crime. Surely, ample op-
portunity existed to obtain search warrant without un-
duly infringing upon the investigative prowness of the 
law enforcement officers. Clearly the instance case does 
not fall within the language of the Rabinowitz decision 
'vhen the court stated: 
"·The judgment of the officers as to when to 
close trap on a criminal committing a crime in 
their presence or who they have reasonable cause 
to believe is committing a felony is not determined 
solely upon whether there was time to procure 
a search warrant. Some flexibility will be accord-
ed law officers employed in the daily battle with 
criminal for whose restraint criminal laws are 
essential." 
T·o condemn this practice would insure not only the pro-
tection of the law officers, but the tradition of our gov-
ernment against search and seizures without warrants. 
A correlative factor which must necessarily be con-
sidered in determining the reasonab1enPs of the search 
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is the fast that the search was a "fishing eiXpedition" on 
the part of the City Marshall. The search J;>y the City 
Marshall was exploratory in nature and without suffi-
cient cause. Neither a warrant for arrest was issued, nor 
had a complaint been issued. That general exploratory 
searches can not be undertaken 'vith or without search 
warrant has been settled in the Federal 'Courts. See 
Go-Bart In~porting Co. vs. U.S., 282, U.S·. 344, 75 L.Ed. 
37 4 (1930) and U.S. vs. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. C. 
420, 7~6 L~.Ed. 877, 82 ALR 775 (1932). Aside from the fact 
the defendant was hauling coal to him home on N ove1nber 
18, 19'61 from the victim's store (R-39), no other incriin-
inating factors exist to justify the unconstitutional intru-
sion of the residence where the defendant kept his per-
sonal belongings while he was away on the Air Force. 
On two occasions, the defendant had denied any iinplica-
tions with the larceny (R-94-95) and the City 1farshall 
had searched the barn and granary, not the house, a 
Inonth and two days after date of crime and found no-
thing. (R·-115). Further, the defendant City Marshall 
indicated that he could have got a search "\\'"arrant. (R-
115). 
To permit such conduct would render our statute 
(Utah 'Code Annotated 77-54-1) on obtaining search "\Yar-
rants a nullity and meaningless for the protection of in-
di-vidual safeguards against unronstitutional invasion 
The Appellant further contends that the State failed 
to juRtify thP searr.h of the defendant'~ roon1~ in thP 
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absence of a warrant, on the bases of the defendant's 
Inother's consent. Although the constitutional imunity 
against unreasonable search and seizure may be waived 
by volunteer, invitational consent to the se·arch or 
seizure, 79 C J S Sec. 62, P816; the intent to waive must 
be positively established, U.S. vs. Lydecker, N.C., N.Y., 
275 F 976, U.S. vs. K elih, D.'C. Ill, 272 F 484, and the 
consent must be real consent; a mere gesture or failure 
to object may not be enough. People vs. Zeigler, 358 
Mich. 355, 100 SW 2d 456 (1960), People vs. Hill31 Misc. 
2d 985, 221 r·LY. S2d, 875. The consent must be voluntary 
and mere asquiescence in authoriative demands does not 
effect the necessary waiver of rights. ·Johnson vs. U.S., 
333 U.S. 10 (1948), Amos vs. [J.S., 255 U.S. 313 (1921), 
Clay vs. U.S., 239 F2d 196 (5th Cir. 195·6). The Federal 
Rule is clearly pointed out in U.S. vs. Gregory, D.C., N.J. 
204 F Supp. 884 ( 1962) \Yherein the Court stated: 
"Acquiescence to search without warrant, 
is resignation, a mere submission in an orderly 
way to action of arresting agent is not consent 
which constitutes unequivolcal, free and intelli-
gent waiver of fundamental right." 
Taking the record in the light favorable to the state, 
it would appear that the 'City Marshall asked the de-
fendant's mother if they could look in her home for the 
property they suspected the defendant had taken (R-9·6) 
to which she said yes. She did ask for search warrant 
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(R-114). It is submitted that the record does not show 
that this was other than mere acquiescence to the author-
ity of the law enforcement officers. 
The waiver and consent must be shown by convinc-
ing, clear and convincing, or clear and positive evidence 
and the burden rests on the party alleging the waiver; 
to wit, the appellee. Judd vs. U.S., C.A. 190 F.2d 649. 
Gibson vs. [T.S., 66 S .. ·ct. 29, 326 U.S. 724, 90 L.Ed. 429; 
Nueslein vs. District of Columbia, 115 Fed. 2d 690, 73 
App. D.C. 85; Edwards vs. State, 177 P.2d 143, 83 Okla. 
Cr. 340; Dawson vs. State, 175 Pac.2d 368, App .. Okla., 
Cr. 263; Bolger vs. U.S., D.c·. N.Y. 189 F. Supp. 237, 
affirmed C.A. 293 Fed. 2d 368 reversed on other grounds, 
83 S. Ct. 385, 371 U.S. 392, 9 L.Ed. 2nd 390. U.S. vs. 
Rugheiser, D.~C. N.Y. 203 F. Supp. 891. U.S. vs. Gregory, 
D.~c·. N.Y. 204 F. Supp. 884. Sa.gonias vs. St.ate, Flo., 89 
F. 2d 252. State of Morz.t. vs. Tomick, 332 F2d 987. State 
vs. Sheppard, Iowa 124 ~~.\V2d 712. Statr vs. Collins, 
Conn. 191 A2d 253. Pekar vs. U.S., 315 F2d 319 (5th 
Cir. 1963). lllcDonald vs .. rT.s., 307 F2d 272 (lOth ICir. 
1962). Voluntary consent requires sufficient intelligence 
to appreciate the act as well as the consequences of the 
acts agreed to. Since the constitutional guarantee is not 
dependent upon any afffirtnative act of the citizen the 
courts do not place the citizen in a position of either 
eontPsting thP officer's authority by force or \Yaiving 
his con~titutional rights but instead they hold that a 
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peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent 
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of 
regard to the supremacy of the law. 
As illustrative cases on this issue, see following cases 
where evidence of consent was held insufficient to show 
voluntary consent : 
Herter vs. U.S., ·CCA. Mont., 27 F2:d 521 (1928) 
where police stated "If you haven't any beer, you do not 
1nind my looking for it." 
Smith vs. Commonwealth, 283 Ky. 492, 141 S.W.2d 
881, (1940) where defendant said "all right." 
Pritchett vs. State, 78 Okla. ~Cr. 67, 143 P'2d 622 
(1943) where defendant stated "you do not have a search 
\Varrant, just go ahead." 
U.S. vs. Slusser, D. Ohio 270 F 818, where defendant 
stated "all right, go ahead." 
People vs. Sapp, 249 N.Y. S.2d 1020 (1964), whe·re 
the officer after arresting the defendant on a minor traf-
fic violation inquired of the defendant if he was writing 
number again and said "Do you want to give them to me 
now or at the station house." Defendant turned envel-
ope over to officer and the court reversed stating that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
it was the burden of the District Attorney to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that a person consenting 
to a search for, or voluntarily surrendered the property. 
the possession of which is unlawful or would implicate 
him in a crime. The district attorney failed in this bur-
den by not submitting anything which would alter the 
perspective of the facts in the record. 
State vs. Trumb~tll, 23 Conn. Supp., 41, 176 A2d 887. 
( 1961) where defendant was informed that the police 
had a right to see the articles and nothing was said about 
defendant's legal rights or privilege to obtain counsel.. 
'The instant case clearly falls within the wording and 
spirit of the aforementioned cases. The attitude 'vith 
which this particular issue should be approached can be 
found in [J.S. vs. Hoffenberg, E.D. N.Y., 24 F Supp. 989,. 
'vherein the c·ourt stated; 
"An illegal search and seizure usually is a 
single incident, perpetuated by surprise, con-
ducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's 
supervision and limited only by the judgment and 
xnoderation of the officers "\Vhose own interests 
and records are often at stake in the search. There 
is no opportunity for injunction or appeal to dis-
interested intervention. The citizens choice is 
quietly to submit to whatever the officer under-
takes or to resiRt at risk of arrest or immediate 
. l " v1o ence. 
Another problem raised by the instant case is "\Yhe-
ther the appellant is bound hy the purported consent on 
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the part of his mother. The defendant was not living 
with his mother at the time of the search but was in fact 
in the Air Force. He, however, did have his room in his 
mother's house and kept his personal belongings there. 
In fact, he was a tenant in his mother's house. Although 
the California cases conflict with the federal rule, this 
conflict can no longer exist in the face of Stoner vs. ·Cali-
fornia, 84 S.Ct., 889, (1964), wherein the Supreme ~c·ourt 
of U.S. rejected the argument that a search of hotel room, 
although conducted without consent of the accused was 
la\\ruful because it vvas conducted \Yith the consent of the 
hotel clerk. 
See McDonald vs. r:.s., (1948) 335 U.S·. 45, 69 S.Ct. 
191, 93 L.Ed. 153, involving the search of occupant's room 
in a boarding hous(~ and Chapman vs. r!.S., 365 U.S. 610, 
81 S.1Ct. 776 (1961) \\"herein the consent of landlord on a 
bases for search of tenants room was held to be unlavv-
ful. A eomment on the Chapman case is found in Gree11 
vs. Yeager, 223 F. Supp. 545, (1963), wherein a habeaus 
corpus proce·eding in the federal court struck down a 
state conviction \vhere the evidence showed that some of 
the stolen articles were taken from defendant's roo1n at 
hotel while door was open and prior to defendant's ar-
rest and the court stated: 
"Although not expressly stated in ~Chapman, 
the clear implication of that opinion is that any 
evidence obtained by a warrantless search of any 
premises in the absence of the accused, whether 
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the subsequent arrest be with or without a war-
rant, is inadmissable solely on the basis that the 
search was not incident to, but preceded a lawful 
arrest. 
The only exception to this rule would be 
where 'comp-elling circumstance' such as the 
threatened destruction of evidence exists." 
The instance case falls within the prohibition pro-
nounced by the t'vo above cases. The search was con-
ducted prior to arrest and was not incident to any arrest 
and accomplished in the appellant's absence. 
Assuming that consent of the mother is binding upon 
the defendant, the appellants position would still war-
rant a reversal. ·The right of officers to search is only 
co-extensive with the particular search consented to. 
Thus consent to search a portion of the structure does 
not give the right to search the whole structure. U.S. vs. 
M cCunn, D.~c., N.Y. 40 Fed.2d 295; or does the consent 
to search defendant's room extend to the unscrewing of 
the defendant's locked phonograph. (R-116). Clearly, 
a monther's right to consent does not extend to the de-
fendant's personal locked belongings. Moreover, there 
did not appear any consent on the mother's part to per-
Tnit thP offjrers to disengage thP scre,vs. 
·The case of H ol.zhe.z vs. [7.8., C.A. Flo. (1955) 223 
F2d 823, directly prohibits the type of conduct display by 
the city marshall and the victi1n's brother. The federal 
rourt struck do,Yn the ronduct of government officials 
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\\~here the officials obtains the consent of the defendant's 
daughter and son-in-law to search their premises, in 
\\Thich the accused \Vas staying and the agents found 
locked boxes and cabintes and opened up the same. The 
c·ourt stated that the search \Vas prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment in that the consent to search the premises 
did not and could not be extended to authorize the force-
able entry and search of the defedant's personal locked 
pffects. The court further \\rPnt to say, in effect, that 
the officers w·ere engaged in a 1nore or less exploratory 
s0.arch and had they not been on such a search, no reason 
appears for their not obtaining a search warrant. Also 
see [J.S. vs. BlokJ ·C.A. Col. 188 F2nd 1019 (19·51), where-
in the Court held that although en1ployers of the defend-
ant could consent to the search of the room, their con-
sent could not extend to the defendant's business desk. 
ThP Apellant respectfully submits that the instancP 
case warrants reversal on the grounds of that thP facts 
clearly shows a violation of th(~ Appellant's rigJ1t against 
unlR\vful search and seizures. J~xploratory search \Vith-
out search -vvarrant and mere acquiescence on the part of 
the person can not he the basis of any forfeitur(~ of in-
dividual rights. ~rhe Appellant urges this court to en vi H-
i on the road signs; the road in TTtah has hP<ln M aJlperl. 
Respectfully su brni tted, 
.JIMI MITS·UNAGA 
MITSUNAGA & ROSS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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